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Senate Confirmation of
Supreme Court Justices
The Role of Ideology in Senate
Confirmation of Supreme Court
Justices
By JEFFREY A. SEGAL,* ALBERT D. COVER,** AND
CHARLES M. CAMERON***
ABSTRACT
This paper develops and tests a model of roll-call voting on
Senate confirmation of Supreme Court justices. The model as-
sumes that senators prefer to vote for nominees ideologically
close to them and against nominees who are ideologically distant.
However, under normal circumstances in which the nominee
appears qualified and the political environment favors the pres-
ident, a senator is not likely to cast an ideologically motivated
vote against a nominee. Such a vote will probably not lead to
the defeat of the nominee, and yet it might come back to haunt
a senator at re-election time. The decision calculus of an ideo-
logically distant senator changes as an objective case can be
made against a nominee's qualifications. In this case the costs
of opposing a vulnerable nominee are lower. At the same time
the benefits of opposition rise as the odds increase that the
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disliked nominee can indeed be defeated. Similarly, the benefits
of opposition increase when the political environment is hostile
to the president, for defeat may again be likely. The model is
tested with probit on the 2,048 confirmation votes from Earl
Warren to Anthony Kennedy. The interactions of ideological
distance with candidate quality and the political environment
have powerful effects on confirmation votes.
INTRODUCTION
Article II, section 2 of the United States Constitution pro-
vides the president with the power to appoint "judges of the
Supreme Court" with the "advice and consent of the Senate."
Though the Senate frequently withheld its consent during the
latter part of the Nineteenth Century,' 43 of the first 44 nominees
this century were approved. 2 As recently as 1983, Richard Fried-
man was able to write that "the confirmation process has, for
the most part, become routine. ' 3 Yet, three of four nominees
were rejected between 1968 and 1970, 4 and President Reagan
failed in his attempts to place both Robert Bork and Douglas
Ginsburg on the Court. Further, nine of the 20 post Brown v.
Board of Education5 confirmations can be labeled controversial, 6
compared to only four of the 19 prior to Brown .
As of this writing the Reagan revolution has not included
the end of affirmative action, the overturning of Roe v. Wade,8
or the reimposition of school prayer. If it does not, the reason
may well be the inability to seat Robert Bork. Explanations for
why senators voted as they did on Bork and other nominees are
incomplete. The goal of this project is to develop and test a
' Cole, The Role of the Senate in Confirmation of Judicial Nominations, 28 AM.
PoL. Sci. REv. 875 (1934).
2 L. BAUM, THE Smntm COURT at 257-60 (1989).
3 Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nomi-
nations: From Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDozo L.
REv. 1, 1 (1983).
SId.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
6 See Songer, The Relevance of Policy Values for the Confirmation of Supreme
Court Nominees, 13 L. & Soc'Y. REv. 927-48 (1979); L. BAUm, supra note 2.
7Id.
8 410 U.S. 113 (1972).
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model of Supreme Court confirmation votes. The proposed model
assumes an interactive relationship between a senator's ideology
and both the nominee's characteristics and the political environ-
ment. Specifically, a senator will increasingly prefer to vote
against a nominee the greater the ideological distance between
the nominee and the senator. However, there are costs to such
a vote, for purely ideological opposition to a well-qualified
nominee may come back to haunt a senator at re-election time.
Senators will restrain their proclivities unless the benefits of a
negative vote are higher (e.g., there is a substantial probability
of rejecting a disliked nominee) or the costs of a negative vote
are lower (e.g., a case can be made against the nominee on
nonideological grounds). Under these circumstances, we expect
a senator's vote to be closely related to measures of his or her
ideology. The model is tested on the 2,048 confirmation votes
cast by senators since the appointment of Earl Warren.
LrrRATURE REVIEW
The political science literature is filled with historical analyses
of Senate confirmation of Supreme Court justices.9 In these
works, each appointment is examined individually, with a focus
on the particular factors affecting each decision. Though some
factors are idiosyncratic, others are more general. Charles War-
ren,'0 Daniel McHargue," and Henry Abraham 12 all cite the
qualifications of the nominee, the politics of the nominee, and
the politics of the president as frequent causes of rejection.' 3
9 H. ABRAHAM, JUSnCES AND PRESIDENTS (1974); A. BLAusTEn & R, MERSKY,
THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES (1978); D, DANELSKI, A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE IS
APPonqTED (1964); J. HARIS, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF
THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE (1953); J, SCHMI-
DHAUSER, JUDGES AND JUSICES (1979); R, SciotsANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRESIDENCY (1971); C. WARREN, TIE SUPREM COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1923);
Cole, supra note I; Friedman, supra note 3; Grossman & Wasby, The Senate and
Supreme Court Nominations: Some Reflections, 1972 DUKE LJ. 557-91; D. McHarque,
Appointments to the Supreme Court of the United States: The Factors that Have
Affected Appointments, 1789-1932, (unpublished dissertation, University of California
at Los Angeles, 1949).
10 C. WARREN, supra note 9,
" D. McHarque, supra note 9.
' H, ABRAHAM, supra note 9,
" Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Justices: Partisan and Institu-
tional Politics, 49 J. PoL, 998, 999 (1987),
1988-891
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A few scholars have attempted to analyze the population of
confirmation outcomes from a behavioral perspective. Robert
Scigliano's bivariate analysis finds that partisan control of the
Senate, the timing of the nomination, and the potential for
Senatorial courtesy have affected the likelihood of confirma-
tion. ,4 Jan Palmer proposes an economic theory of confirmation,
with legislators selling "their 'product' to those who outbid rival
groups or coalitions." 5 His logistic model found that the time
into the president's term and the percent of the Senate composed
of the president's party were significant, 6 while the age and
party of the nominee and elevation to chief justice were not.' 7
Jeffrey Segal's multivariate analysis demonstrated the negative
impact for the president of lame duck appointments, 8 not con-
trolling the Senate, 9 nominating a cabinet member, 20 and pro-
moting an associate justice.21
The historical and empirical studies described all rely on the
confirmation decision as the unit of analysis. Far fewer studies
have disaggregated the results and examined the actual votes of
senators. The best known of these is David Danelski's study of
the Pierce Butler nomination.2 However influential Danelski's
work may be, it studies but one nomination, and its findings,
therefore, must be viewed with caution. David Rohde and Har-
old Spaeth examined the Senate roll call votes in the nominations
of Abe Fortas, Clement Haynsworth, G. Harrold Carswell, and
William Rehnquist.23 They first found that the votes on these
nominations formed an acceptable cumulative scale.24 They then
hypothesized that ideology was the underlying dimension of that
scale.2 1 Measuring ideology by the Conservative Coalition Sup-
14 R. SCiGLIANO, supra note 9, at 98-103.
11 Palmer, Senate Confirmation of Appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court, 41
REv. Soc. ECON. 152, 153 (1983).
16 Id. at 155.
17 Id. at 160.
11 Segal, supra note 13, at 999, 1008.
19 Id. at 1007.
20 Id. at 1008-09.
21 Id. at 1009.
2 D. DANELSKI, supra note 9.
D. ROHDE & H. SPaTH, SuPRE E CoURT DEcIsIoN MAKING 105-06 (1976).
' Id. at 105.
2 Id.
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port score,26 they found strong relationships between ideology
and votes. 27 The relationships held after controls for party. 28
A broader study was conducted by Donald Songer, who
examined the fourteen most controversial twentieth-century nom-
inations.29 Songer argued that ideology would be the decisive
factor in determining a senator's vote in controversial nomina-
tions. Specifically, he claims that "[flor each controversial nom-
ination, the policy positions of senators supporting the nominee
will be different from the positions of those in opposition on
the most salient issues with which the Court is expected to
deal." 3 0
Given the presumption of confirmation, those in support of
the nominee will include senators who agree with the nominee's
views and those who do not. On the other hand, those who
oppose the nominee will consist mainly of those who disagree
with the nominee's views. Therefore, "[oln the most salient issue
with which the Court is expected to deal, opponents of the
nomination will be more homogeneous as a group in regard to
the issue than will supporters of the nomination. '31
In all fourteen nominations, those favoring the nominee
differed in roll-call votes on salient issues from those opposing
the nominee, even after controls for party were made. 32 Ethics,
widely debated in the Fortas, Haynsworth, and Carswell nomi-
nations, appear to be related to votes only in the Carswell case. 33
The evidence suggests that opposing senators were more clustered
at ideologically extreme positions than supporting senators.3 4
Herbert Weisberg and John Felice conducted the most exten-
sive study to date,35 re-examining the Rohde and Spaeth and
- The conservative coalition support score is the most widely used measure of the
liberalism of members of Congress. It is compiled annually by Congressional Quarterly,
Inc. Id.
2' D. ROHDE & H. SpAm, supra note 23, at 105.
2 Id. at 106.
" Songer, supra note 6, at 930.
30 Id. at 931.
31 Id.
12 Id. at 935.
'3 Id. at 939-41.
Id. at 941-42.
31 H. Weisberg & J. Felice, An Ideological Model of Senate Voting on Supreme
Court Nominations, 1955-1988, (1988) (paper presented at the annual meeting of Midwest
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois).
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Songer hypothesis that ideology plays a crucial role in contro-
versial nominations. Using proximity scaling, regression, and
probit analysis, they achieve impressive results: the data fit the
proximity scale; the R2s in the regression models are consistently
high; and the proportion predicted correctly in the probit models
are above the .9 range. Yet, there is much that their model does
not tell us. The model focuses only on nominations on which at
least ten percent of the senators cast "no" votes, and therefore
makes no attempt to explain which nominations will become
controversial and which will not. What Songer declared is still
true: "There have been no systematic explanations why a ma-
jority of nominations remain essentially noncontrover-
sial .... 36 Second, their model has incomplete explanatory value.
By running separate equations for each vote, the result is a
unique constant and unique slopes for each nominee, with no
explanation for the particular values that are achieved. Thus,
while their statistical model can tell us why some senators voted
for Bork and others did not, it cannot tell us in advance where
the breakpoint will be, nor can it ever tell us why some who
were against Bork voted for Rehnquist, and why all who voted
against Rehnquist voted for Scalia. Notably, their model cannot
take into account either the political environment or the nomi-
nee's characteristics. These same limits likewise apply to the
Rohde and Spaeth 7 and Songer 38 studies. We propose to improve
on these earlier works by developing and testing an interactive
model of Senate confirmation. We hold that the votes of sena-
tors can be explained by the interactions of ideology with the
political environment and the nominee's characteristics. We be-
gin with the rationale for our interactive model.
ON SENATE GOALS IN THE CONFRMATION PROCESS
Although the balance of factors that affect a senator's de-
cision on supporting or opposing a judicial nomination is not
well known-indeed that is the focus of the proposed project-
at a general level we can assume that voting in this area is
36 Songer, supra note 6, at 929,
1, D. ROHDE & H. SPAETH, supro note 23,
3, Songer, supra note 6.
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influenced by concerns similar to those that arise in other areas.
More generally, we can assume that the decision-making process
leading up to a vote on judicial nominations will be similar to
that preceding votes on other issues. There are, of course, many
different models that have been proposed to explain legislative
voting behavior, either generally or in particular policy domains.
For our purposes an appropriate model of the decision-making
process has been developed by John Kingdon.3 9
Kingdon lays out what he describes as "the consensus mode
of decision" in which legislators attempt to achieve their goals
in an environment where the degree of controversy surrounding
each voting decision varies. 40 The amount of controversy sur-
rounding a given vote determines the particular factors that enter
into each legislator's voting calculations. For the significant
number of noncontroversial issues, i.e., issues for which there
seem to be no disagreement as far as a legislator can determine,
then the voting rule is simple: follow the herd. 41 With no intrinsic
incentive to stand out as different, members will go with the
crowd when the crowd moves, without complaining, in a given
direction. In contrast, the existence of controversy on an issue
requires a more difficult rule of decision.
For a controversial issue, legislators must implicitly ask them-
selves whether their personal goals are likely to be affected by
their positions on the issue. If one or more of their goals might
be affected, then legislators must assess the risks and rewards
of each position with respect to the relevant goal or goals. 42
Adapting a set of goals originally presented by Richard
Fenno,43 Kingdon argues that the primary goals likely to interest
members are: satisfying constituents, developing intra-Washing-
ton influence, and fostering good public policy. 4 Although the
ranking among these goals may differ from one member to
another, Kingdon plausibly argues that for salient issues in which
constituents have an interest (or in which members think their
11 J. KINODON, CONGRESSMEN'S VOTING DECISIONS (1981).
10 Id. at 242-61.
4, Id. at 243.
41 Id. at 243-46.
4 R. FENNO, CONGRESSMEN IN CoMammEs (1973).
" J. KiNGDON, supra note 39, at 246.
1988-89]
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constituents might develop one), the incentive to satisfy constit-
uents and hence improve re-election prospects is likely to prove
most powerful. 45 As one senior member purportedly told a newly
elected member, "You have two duties. Number one - get re-
elected. Number two - let nothing get in the way of number
one."
Thus far the discussion of decision-making has been rather
general. How does all this apply to the situation confronting a
senator who must decide how to vote on a nominee to the
Supreme Court?
Typically, we would assume that the process of filling a
vacancy on the Court will be well covered by the news media.
Although not generally the sort of issue eliciting intense interest
among constituents, the process is one that members are likely
to consider fairly salient, or at least potentially salient, to con-
stituents. Hence, whatever other goals may be affected by a
confirmation vote, the goal of satisfying constituents should be
a priority for members contemplating their position with respect
to Supreme Court nominees. If so, then the question facing
senators is what their constituents want out of the confirmation
process.
For the most part the background and philosophy of nomi-
nees will not be well-known to constituents, so they will have
little or no specific information on nominees in evaluating pro-
spective new Court members. As long as this remains the case
throughout the confirmation process, few constituents will care
very much about the fate of particular nominees. The relative
invisibility of nominees is assured to the extent that a consensus
develops among senators that there is nothing in the nominee's
background likely to prove controversial. The consensus mode
of decision-making will lead to overwhelming support for nom-
inees if the confirmation process is uneventful. In contrast, a
senator may begin seriously considering opposition to a nominee
if conflict does arise during the confirmation process. With a
breakdown of consensus each member must more actively con-
sider how his or her goals are affected since the "herd" gives
some preliminary signs of splitting apart. Each member must
41 Id. at 249.
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carefully assess the costs and rewards of opposition. How will
a vote against a nominee play back in Peoria?
The costs of opposition largely arise from the presumption
of competence afforded Supreme Court nominees. In general
the Court is a respected institution, and people assume that only
qualified individuals will be nominated for positions on it. Hence,
the assumption is that opposition to a nominee will not be
undertaken lightly but will spring from serious reservations about
the ability of a nominee to meet the high expectations people
have of Supreme Court justices. If the burden of proof does lie
with those who oppose a nominee, then for senators contem-
plating opposition, what factors will help satisfy constituency
concerns about frivolous opposition to a nominee?
One factor that will help free a concerned senator to oppose
a nominee is the existence of an issue or issues that would be
perceived as legitimate grounds for opposition by constituents.
A trivial issue will not do. Something casting doubt on the ability
of a nominee or on the nominee's character might well suffice.
Traditionally, a nominee's ideology has not been considered
adequate grounds for opposition. Senate debates on Supreme
Court nominees make it clear that ideological arguments are
generally taboo. 46 A liberal senator may find the conservative
nominee repugnant because of the nominee's ideology, but that
has not been perceived as a legitimate rationale for opposition,
except in the most extreme cases. A large ideological gulf be-
tween a senator and a nominee may predispose the senator to
oppose the nomination, but the public arguments almost invar-
iably focus on other grounds. The ability or character of the
nominee, not the nominee's ideology, have been sanctioned by
custom as appropriate grounds for debate and opposition.
If such issues do arise, then that should act as an instigator
of ideological voting. Senators who favor the policies of the
nominee will, as before, have an incentive to support the nOm-
inee, in this case helping to protect the endangered nomination.
Senators who oppose the policies of the nominee will have an
incentive to move from acquiescence to active opposition of the
nominee. Senators who disagree with the nominee and who want
46 Ideology as Court Issue, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1987, at Al.
1988-89]
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to make good public policy can further their policy goals by
opposing the nominee, and do so without potentially antagoniz-
ing constituents. Further, there is a large potential benefit in
opposing less-than-distinguished nominees, for such persons can
possibly be defeated. Hence, the existence of controversy should
foster ideological voting among senators as those senators who
agree with the nominee's policy positions and those who disagree
square off in their attempt to implement favored policies through
Supreme Court nominations.
Finally, there may be some circumstances where senators will
vote on purely ideological grounds. As noted previously, satis-
fying constituents is a major concern, but it is not the only
concern of senators. Freed from the necessity of running for re-
election every second year, senators have the luxury of pursuing
other goals more readily than do their colleagues in the House.
(That, at least, was the hope expressed by Madison and Ham-
ilton as they argued for the wisdom of bicameralism in The
Federalist.)47 For many senators the goal of fostering what they
perceive to be good public policy may also be significant. To
what extent is this goal likely to be relevant as senators consider
a Supreme Court nominee? It depends on the circumstances. In
particular, the benefits that a senator attaches to pursuing good
public policy depends on the political context surrounding the
nomination process.
In general, if the nomination is not controversial, a senator's
policy preferences are of little consequence. A senator pleased
at the prospect of the nominee's confirmation will naturally vote
for the nominee, but even a senator unhappy about the policies
espoused by the nominee is unlikely to oppose the nominee if
there are no legitimating issues raised concerning the nominee's
character or ability. Such opposition would likely prove ineffec-
tive, and thus, from the perspective of the unhappy senator,
would fail to move the Court toward "better" decisions.
Opposition could, however, prove fruitful if the political
situation made the nomination more vulnerable than otherwise.
For example, as a president's term of office approaches its end,
the incumbent's clout with the Senate will likely decline. Outright
47 Tie FEDERALIST Nos. 51, 61, 62 (P. Ford ed. 1898).
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opposition or stalling the nomination in this circumstance might
well produce a real policy impact since a new president might
send to the Senate the names of nominees who have different
policy preferences than those from the old regime. Another
political factor that might make opposition fruitful for a senator
displeased with the policies of a nominee is which party controls
the Senate. If the president's party does not control the Senate,
then on balance the odds of successfully fighting a nomination
improve. Hence, opposition control should increase the odds
that ideological voting will occur on nominations.
We conclude from our analysis that while senators will gen-
erally support Supreme Court nominees, opposition is likely to
arise under certain circumstances. The discovery of issues con-
cerning a nominee's character or ability will make legitimate
opposition, particularly from those ideologically opposed to the
nominee. A further spur to opposition among senators unsym-
pathetic to a nomination is the possibility that their opposition
might realistically have an impact on public policy. Ideological
voting is likely to emerge if the party controlling the White
House is a minority in the Senate. It is also likely to develop as
presidents approach the end of their time in office.
BUILDING A MODEL OF SENATE CONFIRMATION
The first step in building a model of Senate confirmation
involves measuring the distance between any given senator and
the nominee. We proceed as follows: A senator's ideology may
be measured fairly easily by the support scores given by the
Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). Scores range from 0
(most conservative) to 100 (most liberal). These scores have been
found to be highly stable over time.48 Scores for the ideology
and qualifications of the nominees are not so easy to determine.
Because there are no ready made scores on the nominee, we
conducted a content analysis from a source that contains com-
parable information on each nominee since Earl Warren: state-
ments from newspaper editorials published from the nomination
by the president until the vote by the Senate. We selected four
4 Poole, Dimensions of Interest Group Evaluation of the U.S. Senate, 1969-1978,
25 AM. J. POL. Sc. 49, 65-66 (1981).
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of the nations leading papers, two with a liberal stance (The
New York Times and The Washington Post) and two with a
more conservative outlook (The Chicago Tribune and The Los
Angeles Times).
To conduct the content analysis we trained three students to
code each paragraph for both ideology and qualifications. On
ideology, paragraphs were coded as liberal, moderate, conser-
vative, or not applicable. Liberal statements include (but are not
limited to) those ascribing support for the rights of defendants
in criminal cases, of women and racial minorities in equality
cases, and of the individual against the government in privacy
and first amendment cases. Conservative statements are those in
the opposite direction. Moderate statements include those that
explicitly ascribe moderation to the nominees or those that as-
cribe both liberal and conservative values. The nominees' ide-
ology (NI) was then measured by the formula NI=(Liberal-
Conservative)/(Liberal + Moderate + Conservative). This formula
leads to a scale from + 1.0 (unanimously liberal) through 0.0
(moderate) to -1.0 (unanimously conservative).
On qualifications, paragraphs were coded as positive, neu-
tral, negative, and not applicable. Qualifications include state-
ments as to integrity, temperament, achievement, and education,
but explicitly exclude statements that claim qualifications or lack
thereof based on ideology. Thus, the statement "Robert Bork
has an outstanding academic record" would lead to a positive
coding on qualifications, but the statement "Robert Bork is too
conservative to be qualified for the Supreme Court" would lead
to a not applicable qualifications coding. The measure for the
qualifications of the nominee (NQ) is NQ = (Positive-Negative)/
(Positive+ Neutral+ Negative). This score also ranges from + 1.0
(unanimously positive) to - 1.0 (unanimously negative).
The measures, presented in Table 1, infra, are reliable and
valid. We assessed reliability by using multiple coders on a
twenty-five percent random sample of the data. Using "n" as
our index of intercoder reliability, 49 results of 0.72 for ideology
and 0.87 for qualifications were achieved. Both figures are sig-
nificant at p<.001.
4 K. KRIPPENDORFF, CONTENT AqALYsIs 129-36 (1980).
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Validity is not as straightforwardly determined. We do note
the following: First, the measures have construct validity-they
measure what they are supposed to measure. We do not measure
the actual ideology and qualifications of the nominees, but rather,
the perceptions of their ideology and qualifications. Nominee
Blackmun was perceived to be a conservative, yet has turned
out to be a moderate.50 Unless senators had information that
neither the newspapers nor President Nixon had, their votes
could only be based on his apparent ideology. Second, the scores
have facial validity. While not everyone would agree that every
score precisely measures the perceived ideology of each nominee,
Fortas, Marshall, and Brennan are, as expected, the most liberal,
and Scalia, Rehnquist, Carswell, and Bork are the most conser-
vative. Harlan and Stewart come out liberal, but the debate
about them centered around their support for the overriding
issue of the day, desegregation. 5' O'Connor comes out a mod-
erate, given her previous support for women's rights and abor-
tion.5 2 Indeed, the only hint of opposition to her came from the
right.53 On qualifications, Carswell has by far the lowest quali-
fications score, followed by Haynsworth, the second Rehnquist
nomination (where numerous questions to Rehnquist's integrity
were made), White (a political appointee), and the second Fortas
nomination (where some complaints were heard about the pro-
priety of lecture fees and presidential advising),m Finally, the
ideological variable passes the most stringent test for validity,
predictive ability. For the confirmed nominees, the correlation
between our ideological measure and their later votes as justices
on civil rights and civil liberties cases is 0.80,5 an impressive
figure given the potential for measurement error inherent in
content analysis.
10 Segal & Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts, JTDICA-
TuRE (forthcoming 1989).
11 Four Against Harlan, Wash. Post, March 11, 1955, editorial page; Badgering
Judges, Wash. Post, April 11, 1959, editorial page.
12 39 CONG. QTR. WEEKLY REPORT 1234-5 (1981).
53 Id.
" 44 CoNo. QTR. WEEKLY REPORT 1764-5 (1986); The Fortas Testimony, N.Y.
Times, July 20, 1968, at A26; Justice Fortas and Propriety, Los Angeles Times, June
28, 1968, editorial page.
" Segal & Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of Supreme Court Justices,
AM. POL. Sci. REv. (forthcoming 1989).
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TABLE 1
Ideological and Qualification Scores of Nominees
Nominee Ideology Qualifications
Warren .50 .48
Harlan .75 .71
Brennan 1.00 1.00
Whitaker .00 1.00
Stewart .50 1.00
White .00 .00
Goldberg .50 .83
Fortas 1 1.00 1.00
Marshall 1.00 .67
Fortas 2 .69 -. 27
Burger - .77 - .92
Haynsworth - .68 - .33
Carswell - .92 - .78
Blackmun -. 77 .94
Powell - .67 1.00
Rehnquist 1 -. 91 .77
Stevens - .50 .92
O'Connor -. 17 1.00
Rehnquist 2 -. 91 -.20
Scalia -1.00 1.00
Bork - .81 .58
Kennedy - .27 .78
We now have a score for each senator and a score for each
nominee. Before we can combine them to obtain an ideological
distance score of each senator from a nominee, the scores must
be standardized to control for the different range and variance
between the two measures. Once this is accomplished, we can
compute
ID = (SI - NI)2
where:
ID is the standardized ideological distance between a senator
and a nominee;
SI is the senator's standardized ideology; and
NI is the nominee's standardized ideology.
Since distances must be positive we must use either the absolute
or squared value of the distance. Given norms against strictly
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ideological voting, we use squared distance, as only those ex-
tremely far from the nominee are likely to oppose confirmation.
At this point a simple ideological model of Senate voting
could be tested:
P(Yi=1)=F(a + B1 ID + Ei)
where:
Yi is the vote of a senator on a nomination;
F represents the cumulative normal probability function;
56
a and B are parameters to be estimated; and
E, is an error term.
While we expect ideology to be the most important factor
affecting the votes of senators, we do not expect this simple
model to do very well. A recent example points out the problem.
Liberal senators were very willing to vote against William Rehn-
quist but quite unwilling to vote against the equally conservative
Antonin Scalia.57 As discussed earlier, there are costs to voting
against a nominee on ideological grounds. Ideological distance
is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for opposition. For
ideological opposition to arise, either the costs of opposition
must be lowered (e.g., an objective case can be made against
the nominee) or the benefits of opposition must be increased
(e.g., political conditions make defeat possible). First we examine
the political conditions that make defeat possible.
Segal views the confirmation process in terms of partisan
and institutional politics. 58 Through the history of the Court,
twenty-six nominees have been rejected by the Senate.59 Fifteen
of thirty-six nominees were rejected when the president's party
did not control the Senate, while only eleven of 106 were rejected
when the president retained partisan control 0 Opposition is also
likely to occur during the fourth year of a president's term.
56 McKelvey & Zavoina, A Statistical Model for the Analysis of Ordinal Level
Dependent Variables, 4 J. MATH. Soc. 103, 105-06 (1979).
s7 That the opposition to Rehnquist was ideological is easily demonstrated. The
average ADA score for Rehnquist opponents was 81. For supporters, the score averaged
20. The point biserial correlation is .83.
5' Segal, supra note 13, at 998.
1: L. BAum, supra note 2.
Segal & Spaeth, If a Supreme Court Vacancy Occurs, Will the Senate Confirm
a Reagan Nominee, 69 JuDIcA=tua 186-91 (1986).
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Historically, eleven of twenty-five candidates were rejected dur-
ing the fourth year of a president's term, while only fifteen of
117 were otherwise defeated. 6' We expect ideological distance to
affect senators when the president's party does not control the
Senate or during the fourth year of the president's term. Our
model at this point would be
P(Y1= 1)=F(a + B1ID + B2 (ID*PE) + E)
where:
PE is the Political Environment, and equals 1 if the president
does not control the Senate or if the president is in the fourth
year of his term, 0 otherwise. The main effect, B,, should be
negligible; the interaction, B2, should be strongly negative.
There is considerable scholarly debate on whether the quality
of the nominee affects confirmation. According to Friedman,
rejected nominees during the 19th Century were "no less fit to
serve on the Court than many whose nominations have been
approved. '62 Abraham, on the other hand, claims qualifications
to be a vital factor in Senate confirmation decisions. 63 We believe
that ideological opposition by a senator will occur when an
objective case can be made against the candidate's quality. Our
model at this point is:
P(Y,=1)=F(a + BID + B 2 (PE*ID) + B3NQ + B4 (NQ*ID)
+ E)
where:
NQ is our measure of nominee quality. The estimate B3 repre-
sents the effect of candidate quality on those closest to the
candidate. According to our model, these are people likely to
vote for the candidate anyway, and thus changes in candidate
quality should have only a minor effect on the probability of a
"yes" vote. A perceived lack of qualifications should have the
greatest effect on those ideologically distant to the nominee, for
it provides a ready justification for those who would like to see
the nominee defeated for ideological reasons. In order for this
interaction to work correctly, NQ must be uniformly negative
61 Id.
62 Friedman, supra note 3, at 2.
63 H. ABRAiHAM, supra note 9, at 38-39.
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with those having the highest qualifications having a candidate
quality score of 0.0. Thus, the interaction term for them is zero
regardless of ideological distance. We accomplished the latter by
subtracting NQ from 1.0. As ideological distance increases and
candidate quality decreases, the interaction term decreases and
the probability of a "yes" vote decreases. Thus, B4 should be
strongly positive.
Finally, a control variable for whether the senator is of the
president's party is added. Studies of roll-call votes have long
demonstrated the paramount importance of party identification
to Congress. Herbert Weisberg, for example, found that a simple
model in which each legislator is predicted to vote along with
the majority of the legislator's party is quite successful, correctly
predicting eighty-two percent of the House votes in a large
sample of roll calls.64 Other studies, perhaps most notably Julius
Turner's, have stressed the importance of partisanship as a vot-
ing cue in the U.S. Congress.65 Partisanship is a complex cue,
affecting roll-call voting in many ways. For our purposes it is
important to note, as John Kingdon observes, that the admin-
istration wields more influence over its own partisans in Congress
than it has with members of the opposition. 66 There are several
reasons for the extra measure of deference accorded to presiden-
tial wishes by members of the president's party in Congress.
These partisans often feel that they have a stake (electoral and
otherwise) in the president's success. They are often unwilling
to embarrass the president. A significant number may feel a
personal sense of obligation to the president, especially if they
feel the president was instrumental in their election to the Con-
gress. Reinforcing the sense of loyalty to the president is an
acute sense of distrust for positions adopted by the opposition.
Thus, for a variety of reasons members of the president's party
are likely to be more amenable to presidential persuasion than
are members of the other party. 67 The model to be tested then
is
Weisberg, Evaluating Theories of Congressional Roll-Call Voting, 22 Am. J.
POL. Scr. 554, 559-60 (1968).
63 J. TURNER, PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY 15 (1970).
6 J. KiNODON, supra note 39, at 180.
67 Id.
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P(Y,=I)=F(a + B1ID + B2 (PE*ID) + B3NQ + B4 (NQ*ID)
+ B5SP + Ei)
where SP equals 1 if the senator is of the same party as the
president. The variables are presented in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Vote .85 .36 0.00 1.00
Ideological Distance (ID) 2.17 2.37 0.00 8.92
Pol. Env x ID 1.35 2.07 0.00 8.92
Adj. Nominee Quality (NQ) -. 38 .50 -1.78 0.00
NQ x ID -. 85 1.84 -13.63 0.00
Same Party .50 .50 0.00 1.00
Given limitations on the availability of required data, we test
our model on all votes from the nomination of Earl Warren in
1953 through Anthony Kennedy in 1988. The number of obser-
vations is 2,048. The model is tested with probit analysis 8 To
facilitate interpretability, we also provide results using regres-
sion.6 9
RESULTS
The results of the model are provided in Table 3. The overall
fit of the model is extremely high: the X2 in the probit and the
F in the regression are significant at p<.0001;70 the estimated
R2 for probit and the R2 for the regression are .68 and 0.49
61 Probit is a multivariate technique that, similar to regression, assigns weight to
several variables simultaneously while attempting to forecast the values of the dependent
variable. For further information see McKelvey & Zavoina, supra note 56; see also
Aldrich & Cnudde, Probing the Grounds of Conventional Wisdom: A Comparison of
Regression, Probit and Discriminant Analysis, 19 AM. J. POL. Sci. 571 (1975) (nontechn-
ical summary of probit and regression).
61 See Aldrich & Cnudde, supra note 68.
70 This means that less than 1 time in 10,000 could we have observed these results
if there were no relationship between the votes of senators and the independent variables.
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respectively. 7' The proportion predicted correctly for the probit
model is .93, a fifty-three percent reduction in error.7 2
TABLE 3
Estimates For Confirmation Model
Variable Estimate Z Estimate t
Ideol Dist .037 .991 .003 .826
ID x Pol Env. -. 221 -7.433 -. 038 -10.321
Nom Qual .601 4.515 .079 5.256
NQ x ID .508 9.266 .094 19.787
Same Party .733 6.878 .079 6.776
Constant 1.989 17.157 .966 81.695
X2/F 923.033 389.938
(Estimated) R2  .68 .49
Percent Predicted Correctly .93
Percent Reduction in Error .53
All estimates except Ideological Distance significant at p < .0001
As the relative magnitudes of the probit and regression co-
efficients are fairly similar, we discuss the regression coefficients
to aid interpretation. The constant, .96, represents the probabil-
ity of a positive vote for a senator not of the president's party
with no ideological distance from a candidate of the highest
quality under the most favorable political environment. The
simple effect for ideological distance is not different from zero.
Thus, under these circumstances there is no difference between
ideologically distant and ideologically consonant senators. If
control of the Senate changes to the opposition, as it did between
the Scalia and Bork votes, probabilities change dramatically for
dissonant senators. The slope for the ideological distance/polit-
ical environment interaction is -.038. Ideological distance ranges
from 0 to 8.92. Under these most extreme conditions, the prob-
,1 R1 measures the fit of model and ranges from .00 (no fit) to 1.00 (perfect fit).
An R2 of .68 means that 68% of the variation in the votes of the senators is explained
by the independent variables.
72 With no information we could predict 85% of the votes correctly by predicting
a "yes" vote for every senator. With our variables we are able to predict 93% of the
votes of senators correctly, a 53% [(100-93)/(100-85)] reduction in error.
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ability of voting for a nominee decreases by .313. Under a more
moderate distance, 6.00, the probability decreases by .21.
The qualifications of the nominee has modest effects on
ideologically close senators. The most extreme case is Carswell,
with an adjusted quality score of -1.78. An ideologically similar
senator would have a 11 less probability of voting for Carswell
than the senator would a nominee of average qualifications. For
a less extreme example, Haynsworth, the probability decreases
by only .07. The situation differs considerably for those ideo-
logically opposed to the nominee. In the case of Carswell, a
senator with a moderate ideological distance score of four has
lowered the probability of a positive vote by .68, compared to
a senator ideologically close to the judge. In more moderate
situations, a senator with an ideological distance score of four
would be thirty-three percent less likely to vote for a nominee
one standard deviation below the mean in qualifications than
would a senator ideologically close to the nominee.
Finally, for reasons outlined earlier, senators are more likely
to support those appointed by presidents of their own party than
they are nominees appointed by presidents of the other party,
even after ideology is controlled. The increase in probability is
approximately .08.
JusTicE ROBERT BORK?
Chief Justice Warren Burger announced his retirement at the
end of the 1985-86 term of the Court. At the time, the Repub-
licans held a six-seat edge in the Senate. President Reagan then
nominated William Rehnquist Chief Justice and Antonin Scalia
Associate Justice. At the time, Scalia might have been the most
confirmable nominee in the country 3 Brilliant, affable, experi-
enced, and Italian, Scalia's confirmation might have sailed
through even as late as the Summer of 1988.
A more prescient White House might have foreseen another
vacancy on the Court, especially given the age of the justices.
With twenty-two of the thirty-four Senate seats up in 1986 held
by Republicans, they might also have foreseen the real possibility
71 Segal & Spaeth, If a Supreme Court Vacancy Occurs, Will the Senate Confirm
a Reagan Nominee?, 69 JuDIcATuJR 186, 190 (1986).
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of Democrats taking control. Regardless, if the expected vacancy
did not occur until 1988, confirmation of a controversial figure
such as Bork would be impossible. What would the result have
been if Bork had been nominated in 1986 and Scalia in 1987?
Bork would have had numerous advantages in 1986: the
Republicans would have controlled the Senate; there would have
been eight more members of the president's party in the Senate;
and the Senate was thus more conservative. These circumstances
would have made a successful campaign against Bork difficult.
Ideology alone has no main effect under the political environ-
ment in 1986; its impact is limited to an interaction with can-
didate quality. While there were concerns about the propriety of
his behavior during Watergate and his candor at the Judiciary
Committee hearings, he was still about average in candidate
quality. Thus, the most liberal Democrats-Senators Metzen-
baum, Mikulski, Reigle, and Sarbanes-whose probability of a
"yes" vote on Bork was .12 in 1987, would have had a proba-
bility of a "yes" vote of .65 in 1986. The probability of a "yes"
vote from Senator Kennedy, who praised Bork effusively when
he was nominated for the Court of Appeals, jumps from .31 to
.76. Even accepting the model's inability to account for the
emotional reaction against Bork, it is simple to find eight or
more votes for Bork, and thus his confirmation, in the more
conservative and Republican 1986 Senate.
Alternatively, Scalia would have faced far more difficult
circumstances in 1987. Yet, given his extraordinary credentials,
it is difficult to imagine his defeat. When Scalia was nominated
in 1986, ideology played no role in the vote, because there is no
main effect, the Republicans controlled the Senate, and he had
the highest possible qualifications, eliminating any interactions.
In 1987 there would have been some effect for ideology, for the
Democrats controlled the Senate. This, though, would not have
been enough to overcome his spotless record. We can again look
at Metzenbaum, the Democrat with the most liberal voting rec-
ord. His probability of voting for Scalia in 1986 was 0.99. The
effect of ideology in 1987 would lower that probability to .87.
Without the faintest argument of improper past behavior, Scalia
would have breezed through the Senate. Thus, changing the
sequence of the Bork and Scalia nominations might well have
put both on the Court.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We proposed and tested a model of senators voting on the
confirmation of Supreme Court justices. The model states that
senators prefer to vote ideologically on Supreme Court nomi-
nations but in most circumstances find the political costs too
high. If the nominee is highly qualified, voters might react
adversely to purely ideological opposition. Further, under most
circumstances, the benefits of such opposition are miniscule. As
most confirmation votes are routine, solitary opposition does
little to advance the senator's policy goals. These costs of ideo-
logical opposition are reduced significantly if an objective case
can be made against the qualifications of the nominee. In such
cases, a "no" vote can be easily justified.. The benefits of
ideological opposition can be increased if there is a reasonable
chance the nomination will fail. Then, a senator's opposition
might affect the outcome. Furthermore, a senator will not incur
the costs of voting alone in such circumstances. Historically, the
likelihood of defeat is greatest when the president's party does
not control the Senate or when the president is in the fourth
year of the term in office.
Our cost/benefit approach to senate voting proved fruitful.
The model was tested on the 2,048 confirmation votes from Earl
Warren through Anthony Kennedy. The overall fit was quite
high: Sixty-eight percent of the variance was explained and ninety-
three percent of the cases were correctly categorized. The vari-
ables performed exactly as predicted: weak or no simple effects
were found for ideological distance and candidate quality; sub-
stantial effects were found for the interactions between ideolog-
ical distance and both candidate quality and the political
environment. Thus, ideological distance between a senator and
the nominee will play a sizable role in the senator's voting
calculus when and only when the nominee is of less than sterling
quality or the political environment is hostile to the president.
The model does not account for all factors that have affected
the votes of senators. Southern opposition to Harlan and Stewart
goes beyond what one would expect from ideology alone. Ob-
viously, the single issue of desegregation controlled the votes of
these senators. Unfortunately, the "racial ideology" of senators
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and nominees cannot be consistently measured. And no model
can or should measure Senator Langer's (R.-ND) opposition to
all nominees not from North Dakota.7 4
There are more questions to be answered, but they go beyond
the scope of the current study. The president is successful in
getting agreement from senators, even after controlling for ide-
ology. Surely the effect must vary across senators. What factors
affect presidential influence in these votes? The opinions of
constituents are not measured, nor can they be. Yet, senators'
ADA scores substantially reflect state ideology. 75 To what extent
do senators vote the district, and to what extent do they "shirk"
by voting their personal preferences? Answers to these questions
will help us understand not just Senate voting on Supreme Court
justices, but more general concerns about roll-call voting.
14 H. ABRAtmA, supra note 9, at 238.
7S Carson & Oppenheimer, A Method of Estimating the Personal Ideology of
Political Representatives, 78 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 163-78 (1984).
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